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NOTES
Union Security Under Federal Statutes;
a Primer
by George Maxwell*
U NION SECURITY is a term with many ramifications, all of which
stem from the basic right of a union to represent the em-
ployees of a business in their collective bargaining with the em-
ployer. A union is secure when its right to represent the em-
ployees is embodied in a contract between the union and the
employer, containing a clause which assures the union a con-
tinuing right of representation. Such a contract clause protects
the union from challenge by another union, from repudiation by
the membership during the life of the contract and from a re-
fusal by the employer to recognize the union as the collective
bargaining agent of its employees.
The degree of security which a union possesses, or the absence
of such security, is depicted by certain basic terms such as "open
shop," "closed shop," "maintenance of membership," "union shop"
and "preferential hiring," and may be affected, in addition, by
the union's degree of control of the apprenticeship program in the
trade.
Open Shop.
An "open shop" is one in which the employer may hire whom
he pleases and whose employees need not belong to a union at any
time during their employment. Where there is an open shop the
employees are not represented by any union as their collective
bargaining agent and the employer is free to employ, to dis-
cipline and to discharge employees without let or hindrance by a
union. The employees in an open shop may belong to a union.
The employer may pay wages in accordance with the union scale
and may even deal with a representative of the union; but in the
absence of any contract the union has no security.
The open shop as an element in interstate commerce has
almost departed the scene of labor relations; however, there are
certain outstanding exceptions. Some companies have been able,
even up to the present, to withstand the efforts of the unions to
* Mr. Maxwell graduated from Westminster College with an A. B. degree
in 1926, and is in his third year at Cleveland-Marshall. A former member
of both the War Labor Board and the Wage Stabilization Board during
World War 11, he is head of a firm of labor relations consultants.
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organize their employees. The number of such establishments is
constantly on the decline.
Closed Shop.
The opposite to an open shop is a "closed shop." Where a
closed shop exists no employee may be hired unless he is a
member of the union and all of the conditions of employment
are controlled by the contract between the employer and the
union. This type of relationship is forbidden today by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act which applies, however, only to
businesses in interstate commerce or affecting interstate com-
merce.' The regulation of union-management relationship in
intrastate commerce is, of course, beyond the powers of Congress
and rests with the several states. Due to the limitations of the
power to regulate commerce within a state and because there are
businesses, manufacturing plants and commerce confined within
the limits of a single state the closed shop may still be found in
such situations. 2
Union Shop.
Where the union cannot secure a closed shop it is most likely
to seek a "union shop." A union shop is one in which the em-
ployer may engage the services of employees in the open market,
without reference to their membership or non-membership in a
union; but if an employee is retained on the payroll for thirty days
or more, then he is required to become a member of the union
and to maintain his membership in good standing for the duration
of the contract.3
Maintenance of Membership.
A fourth type of situation is that called "maintenance of mem-
bership." This type of relationship exists when the employer is
free to hire whomever he pleases without reference to member-
ship or non-membership in a union; but all those who, at the
time of the signing of the contract by the company and the union,
are members of the union and those who thereafter become mem-
bers of the union must maintain their membership in the union
149 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1946).
'E.g., building trades.
'This is the type of union security permitted by the Taft-Hartley Law, 49
Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. App. § 151 (1946), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),
29 U. S. C. App. § 165 (Supp. 1947).
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in good standing for the term of the contract. This type of union
security came into prominence as a result of the "orders" of the
War Labor Board during the second world war.4 It was an at-
tempt to preserve the "status quo" of union membership in an
employee unit in order to avoid the strife which might attend
an organizing effort on the part of the union, and also to protect
whatever membership the union might by persuasion enlist.
The device was one of the results of the effort on the part of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to insure continuous production
of goods needed for defense, and was a compromise arranged as
a bargain between labor and management to avert strife and
ensuing strikes. "Maintenance of management" was awarded to
a union in settlement of a dispute with management only if the
union had not been guilty of a work stoppage in its efforts to
negotiate a contract. In other words it was made the policy of the
War Labor Board to award some union security to a union which
gave up its right to strike.
Preferential Hiring.
There is another circumstance in labor-management relations
which provides some measure of security to a union without the
necessity of a formal contract with each employer who employs
members of the union. This is called "preferential hiring." It is
most widely used in commerce passing over the highways of the
seas. Because of the temporary nature of the stay in port of a
ship, it is almost impossible to transact the work of loading and
unloading cargo expeditiously if each shipmaster must negotiate
a contract with the dock-worker's union on the occasion of each
visit to a port. In this situation it is necessary to secure quickly
a crew of longshoremen and the practice has grown up of looking
first to the union for employees. Out-of-work employees register
their availability for work at the union hall and when a ship
docks a call is made to the union for workmen. If the union is un-
able to supply a sufficient force, then the shipmaster may hire
whomever he pleases; but members of the union are given pref-
erence. The same sort of employment practice extends to the
other types of employees needed in the shipping enterprise. The
hiring hall, and preferential hiring, are practices generally pre-
vailing in the shipping industry and attempts to enlarge the
sphere of such practice have not been greatly successful and have
' International Harvester Co., 1 War Lab. Rep. 112 (1942).
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been impeded to a certain extent by some decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board.5
Control of Apprenticeship Programs.
In the days when unions, as such, had only the legal status of
unincorporated societies certain skilled trades were able to es-
tablish a precarious kind of union security through the control
of apprenticeship programs. By virtue of the fact that knowledge
of the trade was usually controlled by the union and union mem-
bers would refuse to work with non-union employees, such
unions could secure favorable terms for their members from
employers needing the skills which the members possessed. In
an historic case in point a union was able to prevent the employ-
ment of a non-member artisan,6 effectively denying his right to
gainful occupation in the trade. However, the security of the
union in its control of such conditions was at best tenuous be-
cause, if the employer could find sufficient artisans for his pur-
pose, he might make membership in a union the reason for dis-
charge of the employee.7
The Wagner Act.
Such was the status of union security until the passage of the
"Wagner Act" in 1935.8 This piece of legislation was the first at-
tempt to bring the matter of labor relations into a settled and
regulated condition. It attempted to bring out of the twilight
zone of conflict between common law and legislation, and into the
field of social recognition, the regulation of relations between
employees and employers. Prior to this time an unscrupulous
employer had almost unlimited freedom in handling employees
and this naturally and frequently led to abuse. The employer by
reason of his control of employment opportunities in most in-
stances need not have paid any heed to the desire of his employees
for collective bargaining. The Wagner Act was intended to re-
store some measure of equality in the bargaining relationship
between employer and employee and to this end it was designed
to encourage the organization of employees into unions.
'Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 75 N. L. R. B. 102 (1948); Julian Freirich Co.,
86 N. L. R. B. 75 (1949).
Mayer v. Journeyman Stonecutter's Ass'n., 47 N. J. Eq ............. 20 Atl. 492(1890).
Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
' See note 1 supra.
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Maximum union security was possible under this Act; but
union membership had been so decimated as a result of the de-
pression which began in 1929 that unions were not able, im-
mediately, to take full advantage of the benefits of the new legis-
lation. It was first of all necessary for them to enlarge their
membership before they could write into contracts with manage-
ment the provisions which gave them the measure of union se-
curity called the closed shop. The organizational effort was at
its height when the second world war interrupted this activity.
The need for production of defense materials brought about the
compromise referred to earlier under the designation of main-
tenance of membership, which was substituted for the closed
shop.9 The National War Labor Board, after much discussion on
policy, adopted as a general practice the awarding of "main-
tenance of membership" to a union provided there was not a
strike in the immediate background. This practice resulted in
the inclusion in many contracts, both initial and renewal types,
of this type of union security.10
The Taft-Hartley Law.
Expiration of the War Labor Board in 1945 left the unions
free to pursue their original purpose with respect to union
security. This resulted in a considerable number of strikes and
a great deal of public discussion of the "right to work" and the
extension of the power of unions to deprive non-member em-
ployees of work. As a result of the resentment directed toward
the increasing influence of the unions, certain amendments to
the Wagner Act were passed by Congress under the popular
name of the "Taft-Hartley Law." 11 The chief effect of these
amendments was to place restrictions of the right of the unions
to require membership as a condition of continued employment,
and the proscription of the closed shop in commerce under federal
regulation. While denying to unions the security of the closed
shop, the Taft-Hartley Act did permit the establishment of the
union shop in certain circumstances. 12 One important condition
to the union's right to a union shop was the holding of an election
under National Labor Relation Board procedures so that em-
ployees could decide whether they wanted a union shop. Be-
'1 N. W. L. B. Termination Rep. 81 (1946).
" See note 4, supra.
"See note 3, supra.
'Id. at § 159 (a) (3).
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cause of the overwhelming approval of the union shop in such
elections Congress in 1951 again revised and amended the Labor
Relations Act and by the so-called Taft-Humphrey amendments
removed the requirement of an election among the employees
before a union shop could be lawfully a part of the labor-manage-
ment contract. 13
A labor union may now demand the inclusion of a union shop
clause in its contract and provide that after thirty days of em-
ployment every employee must join the union and continue to be
a member in good standing for the term of the contract.
One word of caution should be inserted here. While the
Labor Management Relations Act permits the degree of union
security described as the Union Shop, it further provides that
where any State or Territorial statute further limits the degree
of union security than does the N. L. R. A. the greater limitation
shall prevail. 14 Thus strangely does federal legislation yield to
state legislation in this matter even with respect to interstate
commerce.
The National Picture.
The closed shop, the union shop and even maintenance of
membership are prohibited by statutes or constitutional provision
in Arizona, 15 Arkansas, 16 Florida,17 Georgia,' 8  Iowa,19 Ne-
braska,20 Nevada,2 1 North Carolina,22 North Dakota,23 South
Dakota, 24 Tennessee, 25 Texas 6 and Virginia.2 7 It is interesting
to note that the requirement of elections to determine the wishes
of the employees involved on this matter and that a stated per-
centage of votes must be in favor of union security before the
49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. App. § 151 (1946), as amended, 65 Stat. 601 (1951),
29 U. S. C. App. § 159 (Supp. 1951).1 Taft-Hartley Amendments, see note 3 supra.
ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 56-120 (1939).18ASK. STAT. § 81203-81205 (1947).
'
T FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 12.
GA. SESS. LAws 1947, Act 140, § 4, 5.
"IOWA CODE § 736 A-1, 2, 3 (1950).
"NEB. REV. STAT. § 13, 14, 15 (1943).
NEV. Supp. and SESs. LAws 1951, c. 95.
"N. C. CODE § 95-78 to 95-84 (1943).
N. D. REV. CODE § 34-0114 (Supp. 1947).
S. D. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
"TENN. CODE § 11412.8 (1932).
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. 5207a, § 1-5 (1947).
2TVA. CODE § 40-68 to 40-75 (1950).
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inclusion of a union security clause can be lawfully included in
the contract is provided for in the laws of Colorado,28 Kansas29
and Wisconsin.3 0
Despite the requirement of an election for approval of the
union shop it is significant that in 76% of the cases involving the
American Federation of Labor and in 50% of the cases involving
the Congress of Industrial Organizations the union shop provision
was included in contracts concluded in the 1950-51 period.3 1 With
the elimination of the requirement of an election, late in 1951,
union shop provisions may now be enforced and it seems highly
likely that the inclusion of such a provision will soon become a
prevailing condition before negotiation of contracts with the
unions can be successfully concluded. The only obstacle in the
way of such a condition, so far as the law goes, is the restriction
by state legislation of the right to include such clauses in contracts
with unions.
It may be well to pause for a moment to look at an apparent
conflict of trends in the matter of union security and law. A
growing tendency to permit an increase of union security can be
discerned in federal legislation. At the same time there seems to
be a tendency further to restrict union security in state legislation.
Attention has been called above to the fact that federal legislation
yields to the greater restrictions of union security contained in
state law. It ought also to be noted that the majority of states
which have restrictive legislation can be termed predominantly
agricultural in their economy. However, some of these states,
notably those in the southeastern portion of the United States
are now being increasingly industrialized. In these states there
is already evidence of a movement by labor unions to have the
restrictions on union security removed. This may result in the
bringing of federal and state legislation in such areas into con-
formity; but as yet the outcome cannot be predicted.
Further evidence that federal law is gradually reducing the
limitations on obtaining union security, and the union shop,
may be found in the amendments to the Railway Labor Act which
were passed on January 10, 1951.32 These amendments spe-
"COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 131, § 6(1) (c) (1943).
2' KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 191, § 44-809 (4) (1943).
"0WIs. STAT. c. 57, § 111.06(c)1 (1939).
'Laborgraph, Jan. 4, 1952, P. 3-6 (B. N. A.).
44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. App. § 151 (1946), as amended, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951),
45 U. S. C. § 152 (Supp. 1951).
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cifically permit union shop agreements between unions and em-
ployers under coverage of this act. This was a radical alteration
of position, because up to this time union security clauses of any
sort were specifically forbidden by the Act. Since the amend-
ment the union shop clause has been included in a number of
the contracts between the railroads and the "operating" unions.
There is considerable pressure at the present time to have the
clause included in some of the contracts with the "non-operating"
unions representing railroad employees.
That the influence of the federal government seems to be in
favor of the granting of the union shop to further groups of
employees is borne out by recent actions of the Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board. In the matter of the Steelworkers (CIO) and the
major steel companies the Board recommended the inclusion of
the union shop provision in the contract. 33 A similar recommen-
dation has been made in other cases submitted to the Board.3 4
In passing note should be taken of the fact that federal regula-
tion of union security has been almost wholly by statute during
the past twenty years. Case law on the matter has been slow to
develop except as it relates to interpretation of the statutes al-
ready enacted. There is a dynamism in the press of the unions
to gain the maximum measure of union security which will not
wait for the development of law by trial in the courts. Pressure
is brought upon legislatures, as is evidenced by the amendments
to the Wagner Act in succeeding sessions of Congress, in order
to expedite the attainment of the goal and there is an impatience
with the slow accretive process of judicial interpretation of the
will of society. The impatience of the Unions with court proce-
dure is further evidenced by their reluctance to press for their
rights in judicial tribunals; but to go rather to the administrative
agencies in which to try their charges. If decisions run un-
favorably to the -anions involved there is again another appeal to
legislation. The remarkable change in federal legislation during
the past twenty years is evidence of the increasing power,
politically, as well as economically, of the unions and we may
look for further efforts on their part to amend and enact legislation
favorable to the cause of union security.
"In re: United Steel Workers of America (CIO) and Various Steel and
Iron Ore Companies, CCH Emergency Lab. Law 1 40,059 (1952).
" WSB Release, No. 215, April 17, 1952.
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